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Abstract  
 In this paper, we introduce firm heterogeneity in the context of a model of non-compliance 
with minimum wage legislation. The introduction of heterogeneity in the ease with which 
firms can be monitored for non compliance allows us to show that non-compliance will 
persist in sectors which are relatively difficult to monitor, despite the government 
implementing non –stochastic monitoring. Moreover, we show that the incentive not to 
comply is an increasing function of the level of the minimum wage and increasing function of 
the gap between the minimum wage and the competitive wage rate. 
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             1.Introduction 
 
     Received economic theory tells us increase in the minimum wage leads to an increase to 
all wages and thus to unemployment (Jones ,1987, Brown ,1988). The new growth theory , for 
its part, has shown , in certain context, that inequality can be harmful to growth ( Alesina ans 
Rodrik, 1994, Persson and Tabellini, 1992), in that the presence of low income individuals 
increases the incentive to tax productive capital. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), for 
their part, argue that a low level of demand, in conjunction with low levels of remuneration 
can be an impediment to the adoption of new, and more productive, technologies. Cahuc and 
Michel (1996) construct an endogenous growth model in which higher salaries can be 
stimulant to growth in that they encourage the accumulation of human capital, which in the 
framework of  Lucas-type model of growth leads to higher growth rate. 
 
       At microeconomic level, it has been shown by Azam (1992) that a increase in the 
minimum wage in Moroccan  agriculture leads  to a positive effect on agricultural output, 
when one uses an efficiency wage model which takes into account the institutional 
characteristics of a family which shares revenues in order to finance consumption. 
 
      While minimum wage legislation may, through the reduction in inequality it entails; have 
a positive effect on growth, it is not at all certain that firms will respect such legislation. Non-
compliance of firms with minimum wage law, has been studied in a number of environments. 
Ashenfelter and Smith (1979) conclude that (i) the enforcement of minimum wage legislation 
is incomplete despite the government‟s inspection efforts not being stochastic, and (ii) the 
incentives not to comply are increasing in  the absolute value of elasticity of the demand of 
labor. Grenier (1982) finds the opposite result. Chang and Ihrlich (1985) shows that both of 
the preceding results are partially incorrect because the methodological stance they adopt is 
not appropriate.  
         Finally, all of the above mentioned studies do not account for the heterogeneity in 
compliance with minimum wage legislation actually observed in the empirical data. That is, 
they fail to explain why certain sectors comply while others do not. 
          The purpose of the present paper is to take this sectoral heterogeneity into account, in 
the sense that certain sectors are easier to monitor than others. This in turn allows us to show 
why non compliance persists in certain sectors of activity despite frequent inspection by the 
government agencies. 
       2. The Model 
       Consider an economy composed by two sectors: a formal sector which respects 
minimum wage legislation , and informal sector which does not respect the legislation and 
which is competitive. Firms share common production technology, where labor is the only 
input, given by  : 
                             0(.)'',0(.)' , )(  FFlFy                                                    (1) 
Labor market is regulation is given by a minimum wage w for the formal sector. In the 
informal sector, on the other hand, the competitive wage is given by ww
o
 . In order to 
insure compliance with minimum wage legislation, firms are subject to inspection. They may 
be detected as not being in compliance with the minimum wage legislation with probability: 
                        
     1,0,1,0  ,      qqq                                      (2) 
where q is the frequency of inspection, and  parametrizes the success of this inspection; we 
assume that the detection technology is uncertain, it depends upon the observability of the 
activity, the type of evidence available, etc. A firm, which is found to be guilty of paying a 
wage  ww  is assumed to  have  to pay a fine : 
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where l is the size of labor who were hired at the below minimum wage , and f is the penalty 
rate. 
          
We assume that firms which decide not to comply with the minimum wage legislation pay a 
cost c  in order to do so. This cost is assumed to have cumulative density  cH  over the 
interval given by  ccc , . Thus, the number of firms which decide not to comply with the 
minimum wage legislation is given by those firms whose cost of non compliance satisfied the 
following weak inequality  (4): 
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where p is the market price of the good sold by the firm. It follows that the proportion of 
firms which do not comply with the minimum wage law is given by : 
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 Lemma 1: 
  „„ We have the following statics comparatives: 
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      3. Wages and Employment under Non Compliance 
       In contrast to the existing literature, we assume that wage rate in the sector where the 
minimum wage law is not respected is determined by a lateral contract between workers and 
the non compliant firms. Suppose  that the workers in the informal sector who are paid a wage 
ww
o
 know the distribution of firms that  do not apply the minimum wage law and are able 
to offer them a lateral contract which specifies the wage rate at which they are willing to work 
for them. The worker offers the contract, the firm may either take it or leave it. The following 
result characterizes the optimal contract for a simple functional form of the density of non-
compliance costs. 
  
     Proposition 1: 
      „„Suppose that    1,0 ,  ccH   and   1,0c . Then the optimal contract is given 
by  :                             www
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Proof: 
        The informal sector worker offers a wage contract to the firm which maximizes his 
expected rent, whence she solves: 
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The first order condition yields : 
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which , combined with the assumption on the functional of the distribution, yields the desired 
result :           www
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Proposition 1 shows that the wage offered by the worker to the firms is a weighted 
combination of the competitive wage and the minimum wage. It is independent of the 
government policy   fq, . 
 Given the lateral contract, employment in the informal sector firms is given by the solution to 
the following optimization problem: 
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this yields the employment : 
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Let 
o
l be the level of hiring in the competitive sector, and, 
c
l be the level of hiring in the 
formal sector which respects the minimum wage legislation; Then we have the following 
result. 
 
Proposition 2: 
    „„ The hiring levels are such that : 
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    Proof: 
    The result follows directly from the concavity of the production function ans the fact that : 
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4. Government Compliance Policy 
    The government can affect compliance with the minimum wage law by choosing its 
instruments   fq, , that is, the frequency of inspection and the penalty rate. Note that , 
given the contract offered and accepted by informal sectors, the proportion of firms which 
operate in the informal sector is given by : 
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Hence it follows the following  corollary : 
 
  Corollary 1: 
 “ i) The higher the minimum wage , the greater the degree of non-compliance with law 
   ii) The smaller the wedge dividing the competitive wage and the minimum wage, the lesser   
is the incentive not to comply with the legislation e.g: 
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Proposition 3:  
    “  1,0 o  such that the compliance inspection strategy by  the government i sgiven by 
:     
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Proof: Note that : 
  
 
one obtains the desired result.                                                                      (Q.E.D) 
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The proposition 3 shows that in order to obtain full compliance, the policy for the government 
is to carry out  inspection more frequently in those sectors which are more prone to evasion of 
the minimum wage law. 
 
  Corollary 2: 
   “Given the inspection effect, the proportion of firms which do not comply with the 
minimum wage legislation is given: 
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     The corollary confirms the conclusion reached by Ashenfelter and Smith (1979) according 
to whom non compliance with the minimum wage law persists in spite of non stochastic 
inspection policy. The preceding result gives theoretical backing for their conclusion. For a 
penalty rate : ,
1 off 

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
there will always be non-compliance with the minimum wage 
law, which lends credence to a penalty of the form suggested by Becker (1968). 
 
   
 
  4. Conclusion 
       In this paper we have analyzed the issue of non-compliance with minimum wage 
legislation in the context of a model which allows for heterogeneity in inspection stemming 
from the heterogeneity of the activities under monitoring. This uncertainty leads us to our 
main result which holds that non-compliance persists in a number of sectors, a result which 
appears to be broadly consistent with available empirical evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 References 
 
       Alesina, A. And D.Rodrik.(1994), “Distributive Politics and Economic Growth”, The 
Quarterly Journal of Econmics,Vol 109, N°2 (May 1994),  pp.465-490. 
      Ashenfelter,O.,S.Smith (1979), “Compliance with the minimum Wage Law”, Journal of 
Political Economy  87:333-350. 
     Azam,J.P (1992), “ The Agricultural Minimum Wage and Wheat Production in Morocco 
(1971-1989) ”,  Journal of African Economies 1(2), 171-191. 
     Becker.G (1968) , “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach”, Journal of Political 
Economy , Vol 76, pp. 169-217. 
     Brown, Charles. 1988. “Minimum Wage Laws: Are They Overrated?”, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, vol. 2 (Summer): 133-145 
     Cahuc,P..and P.Michel (1996), "Minimum wage, unemployment and growth", European 
Economic Review, vol 47, 1463-82. 
     Chang, Y.M., and I. Ehrlich (1985). “On the Economics of Compliance with the Minimum 
Wage Law”, Journal of Political Economy 93(1), 84-91. 
 
     Grenier, G. (1982) “On Compliance with the Minimum Wage Law” , Journal of Political 
Economy  90, 184-187. 
 
     Jones, S.R (1987), “Minimum Wage Legislation in a Dual Labor Market ”, European 
Economic Review 31 :1229-1246. 
     Murphy,K.,Shleifer, A.and R.Vishny (1989), “Income Distribution, Market Size and 
Industrialization,”  Quarterly Journal of Economics 104:537-564. 
     Persson,T.and G.Tabellini(1992), “Growth, Distribution and Politics ”, European 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings(April) 539-602.    
    Stigler, G. (1970) “The Optimum Enforcement of Laws” Journal of Political Economy 
78(3),526-536. 
 
    Tobol, Y. (2005) “Wage Discrimination as an Illegal Behavior ”, Economics Bulletin 
10(4), 1-10. 
   Yaniv, G. (1988) “Enforcement and Monopsonistic Compliance with the Minimum Wage 
Law” ,Southern Economic Journal 55(2), 505-509. 
 
   Yaniv, G. (1994) “Complaining about Noncompliance with the Minimum Wage Law” 
International Review of Law and Economics 14, 351-62. 
  
   Yaniv, G. (2001) “Minimum Wage Noncompliance and the Employment Decision” Journal 
of Labor Economics 19, 596-603. 
   Yaniv, G. (2004) “Minimum Wage Noncompliance and the Sub-minimum Wage Rate” 
Economics Bulletin 10(9), 1-7. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
